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INTRODUCTION

Many instruments which grant or reserve mineral rights in Texas contain
the words "other minerals."' When the instrument does not specifically list
1. See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. 1971) ("oil, gas and other minerals" often used in Texas deeds); STATE BAR OF TEXAS, LEGAL FORM MANUAL FOR REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 4.8 (1982) ("oil, gas and other minerals" form for mineral reservation); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 879 (1977) (many instruments contain "other minerals" catch-all

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:185

substances which are to be included as minerals, a dispute often arises between the owner of the surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate as
to ownership of the unspecified substances.2 To resolve ownership disputes,
Texas courts adopted a rule of construction focusing on the destructive effects that removal of a particular substance would have on the surface of the
land.3 The original surface destruction test4 and modified versions of the
test 5 yielded unpredictable rj sults causing uncertainty in mineral titles.6
phrase). When the fee simple owner of land grants, conveys, reserves, or excepts minerals, two
separate estates are created: a surface estate and a mineral estate. See Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 235, 176 S.W. 717, 719
(1915) (horizontal division of surface and mineral title); see also Walker, Fee Simple Ownership
of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 125, 128-29 (1928) (landowner effects horizontal
severance of mineral and surface estates by granting mineral rights or by conveying surface
and reserving mineral rights).
2. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1984) (uranium
included in "oil, gas and other minerals"); Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983) (coal and lignite included in "all the minerals"), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
488 (June 12, 1985); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947,
writ ref'd) (sand and gravel not included in "all minerals"). Judicial solutions to ownership
disputes involve the balancing of the need for mineral development against the need to protect
the surface estate. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984); see
also Comment, Lignite.- Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 888 (1977) (courts attempt to accommodate rights of surface and mineral estate owners); Recent Development, 19 TULSA L.J. 448, 448 (1984) (courts balance parties' intentions, need for title certainty, and resource development). Justice Price Daniel of the
Supreme Court of Texas captured the difficulty and the importance of devising a uniform and
comprehensive ownership test when he stated:
Minerals have been a blessing to Texas, but the term has plagued our courts in efforts to
determine what is covered by the term in various leases, reservations and conveyances.
Much of this is because of the failure to enumerate specific minerals intended to be dealt
with, especially when the parties probably had no subjective intent at all concerning minerals known or unknown to them at the time of their dealings.
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 177 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The.
easiest way to prevent ownership disputes over unnamed substances is to specifically list all
substances that will belong to the mineral estate in the instrument which severs the mineral
and surface estates. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751-52 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (specifically naming substances in grant or reservation expresses clear intent); Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (clear intent expressed where substances specifically
reserved), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
3. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (original surface destruction test
enunciated).
4. See id. at 352. Under the original surface destruction test, a substance that would
cause surface destruction when removed was considered part of the surface estate. See id. at
352.
5. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (interprets original surface destruction test), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Tex. 1980) (overrules portions of first opinion). The first Reed v. Wylie decision added two factors to the original surface destruction test,
giving consideration to the location of the substance in the ground, and the time frame to apply
when determining the extent of technological advancement in removal methods. Compare
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In an effort to stabilize mineral titles, the Supreme Court of Texas, in
Moser v. United States Steel Corp. (Moser 1), 7 partially abandoned the surface destruction test and applied an ordinary and natural meaning test.8 The
court, however, withdrew Moser I and issued a second opinion which greatly
restricts the applicability of the ordinary meaning test (MoserII).9 Moser H
allows the surface destruction test to remain an operative force in Texas
mineral law.1 ° Consequently, instead of eliminating title instability, Moser
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977)(near-surface substance not mineral if removal
by all methods existing at time instrument executed would destroy surface), modified, 597
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) with Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (if removal of
substance causes surface destruction, then substance is not part of mineral estate)_The second
Reed v. Wylie decision modified the technology and timing factors of Reed I, emphasizing that
the surface estate owner should try to show that any reasonable removal method would destroy the surface. Compare Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Tex. 1980) (near-surface
iron ore, coal, or lignite not mineral if removal by any reasonable method existing at time
instrument executed or at time of decision would destroy surface) with Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (near-surface substance not mineral if removal by all methods
existing at time instrument executed would destroy surface), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
1980).
6. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) ("determining. . . ownership of minerals in [surface destruction] manner has resulted in title uncertainty"); Comment, The Need for Certainty in Ownership of Minerals: Coal, Lignite, "and
Other Minerals" 22 S. TEX. L.J. 287, 306 (1982) (surface destruction rule causes uncertainty
in land titles); Note, Determinationof Ownership of Near-Surface Mineralsas a Matter of Law:
Moser v. U. S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 719 (1984) (insurmountable title problems
presented by Acker v. Guinn and Reed v. Wylie decisions).
7. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
8. See id. at 428-29. The surface destruction test was only partially displaced because it
would continue to control instruments executed during the twelve-year time frame between
Acker v. Guinn and the date of Moser . See id. at 430. Stated briefly, the Moser test vests title
to a substance in the mineral estate owner if the ordinary and natural meaning of the word
"minerals" includes the particular substance. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984). Before Acker v. Guinn was decided, Texas courts had followed an
ordinary and natural meaning test announced by the supreme court in 1949. See Heinatz v.
Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
9. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary
meaning rule applies only prospectively from June 8, 1983); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.,
28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 455, 455 (June 5, 1985) (Moser H rules apply only to "other minerals"
severances occurring after June 8, 1983); compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (surface destruction approach abandoned "in the case of uranium") with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 428 (June 8, 1983)
(surface destruction approach abandoned), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). See
generally 1 H. WILLIAM & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219, at 266.9-266.11 (1984)
(tracks minor wording differences between Moser I and Moser II and concludes that the
changes greatly restrict Moser II's impact on the surface destruction holdings).
10. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (rules
announced apply only prospectively from June 8, 1983) with Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (Moser II rules apply only to severances after June 8, 1983 and
Acker and Reed surface destruction rules apply to severances before June 8, 1983 where title to
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II actually compounds the problem by perpetuating the source of mineral
title uncertainty. 11
This comment will trace the development of Texas mineral ownership law
from the roots of the surface destruction test through the resurgence of the
ordinary meaning test in Moser I and I. Three possible restrictions on the
applicability of the Moser II test will be discussed: (1) the limitation of
Moser II to a prospective application;12 (2) the exclusion of specific substances from the application of the ordinary meaning test;' 3 and (3) the limitation of the ordinary meaning test based on the wording used to grant or
reserve minerals.14 The effect of the three restrictions on Texas mineral jurisprudence will be analyzed in light of the supreme court's recent decisions
in Friedman v. Texaco, Inc. 15 and Schwarz v. State.16 Finally, this comment
will suggest a solution to the problem of mineral title instability since title
stability is the primary goal pursued by Texas courts.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION FACTOR

In 1949 the Supreme Court of Texas .held that the word "minerals"
should be construed according to its "ordinary and natural meaning." 17 The

uranium is concerned); see also Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985)
(court reaffirms Acker and Reed application for future ownership disputes); Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law: Moser v. U. S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 725-26 (1984) (discussing Moser II prospective language and correctly
predicting that surface destruction test would continue to apply to "other minerals" conveyances made before June 8, 1983).
11. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (application of surface destruction rule caused title uncertainty) with Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (under prospective language in Moser II, Acker and Reed surface
destruction rules apply to all "other minerals" severances made before June 8, 1983 for determining title to uranium); see also Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985)
(Moser II did not abandon surface destruction test for near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore,
and application of Acker and Reed is reaffirmed for determining title to these substances);
Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (Moser II
cited in line of irreconcilable cases compounding Texas mineral title problems).
12. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984).
13. See id. at 102 (list of substances from prior decisions belonging to surface estate as a
matter of law).
14. See id. at 102 ("a severance of minerals in an oil, gas and other minerals clause includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word") (emphasis
added).
15. 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
16. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12, 1985).
17. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). The court
distinguished the ordinary meaning of minerals from the technical or scientific meaning because parties are presumed to be familiar with the ordinary rather than the technical sense of
the word. See id. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997. The technical definition of the word "minerals"
encompasses many substances, including the soil itself. See id. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997; see
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court identified four factors for determining whether a substance was within
the ordinary and natural meaning of minerals: the nature of the substance,
its relation to the soil, its use and value, and the effect of its removal upon
the surface of the land.18 The court refused to give the surface destruction
factor more weight than any of the other three factors.1 9 Twenty-two years
later, with the supreme court's decision in Acker v. Guinn,2 0 surface destruction emerged as the controlling factor in deciding ownership of unspecified
substances.2" Acker states that a substance which must be removed by surface-destructive methods is not a mineral (general intention) unless the instrument of conveyance affirmatively expresses an intention to include the
substance as a mineral (specific intention).22

also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101-02 (Tex. 1984) (technical construction of "minerals" destroys surface/mineral estate distinction).
18. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 515, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995-96 (1949). A substance
was not within the ordinary meaning of minerals if it was not rare or valuable. See id. at 518,
217 S.W.2d at 997; see also Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 607-08 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1952, writ refd n.r.e.) (limestone not within "all oil, gas, casinghead gas and other
minerals" reservation as determined by application of Heinatz factors); Watkins v. CertainTeed Products Corp., 231 S.W.2d 981, 985 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ) (Heinatz
factors applied where sand and gravel, with no peculiar value, held not minerals).
19. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 998 (1949). The fact that a
substance could be removed only by a "method which destroys the surface for agricultural and
grazing purposes" was not decisive of whether it was a mineral. See id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at
998; see also Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Heinatz surface destruction factor not conclusive).
20. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). The court was confronted with the question of whether
iron ore was included in a conveyance of "all of the oil, gas and other minerals." See id. at
349.
21. See id. at 352; see also Recent Development, 19 TULSA L.J. 448, 449 (1984) (Acker
elevates surface destruction factor to conclusive test). Although the surface destruction factor
was de-emphasized in Heinatz, the supreme court has recently identified the Heinatz surface
destruction factor as the origin of the Acker v. Guinn surface destruction test. See Friedman v.
Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 & n.1 (Tex. 1985).
22. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); see also Storm Assocs., Inc. v.
Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 585 (Tex. App.-1982 San Antonio) (Acker refers to general
intent unless a specific intent is expressed in the instrument), affd sub nom., Friedman v.
Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985). In developing the general intent test, the court
reasoned that contracting parties do not ordinarily contemplate "that the utility of the surface
for agricultural or grazing purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired." See Acker v.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). Iron ore was held to belong to the surface estate in
Acker because the ore was deposited very near the surface and outcropped on the surface; it
could only be removed by strip-mining which would destroy the surface; and there was no
affirmative expression in the deed of any right to destroy the land. See id. at 351-53; see also
Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd
n.r.e.) (discussing Acker ownership criteria and Acker holding). For two cases applying the
principles enunciated in Acker, see DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (surface estate includes all surface destructible substances when
no clear intent to permit surface destruction expressed), and Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d
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The judicial trend toward greater protection for the surface estate by using
the surface destruction test to define "other minerals" continued with the
Reed v. Wylie decisions.2 3 The court initially interpreted the Acker general
intention test to mean that a near-surface substance was not a mineral, and
therefore belonged to the surface estate, if the owner of the surface estate
proved that only surface-destructive methods of removing the substance existed at the time the instrument in question was executed (Reed I). 24 Reed I,
unlike Acker, allowed the surface estate owner to establish title to an unnamed substance merely by proving that the substance was deposited "at the
surface" of the land.25
Three years later, the supreme court reexamined the rationale behind the
Acker surface destruction test and issued a second opinion in Reed v. Wylie
(Reed II). 26 The court concluded that if the general intent of the mineral

127, 130-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) ("all minerals, oil, gas and other minerals"
reservation excludes coal and lignite which must be removed by strip-mining). Efforts made
by the mineral estate owner to restore the surface by replacing soil and planting grass and trees
were viewed as irrelevant in the application of the Acker surface destruction test. See Williford
v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
23. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); see
also Note, Mines and Minerals - Title to Minerals - Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15
ST. MARY'S L.J. 477, 488 & n. 66 (1984) (Acker and both Reed v. Wylie decisions reflect
court's concern for surface protection). In Reed v. Wylie, the owner of the mineral estate
contended that he was entitled to coal and lignite under a deed reservation of "all oil, gas and
other minerals." See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 170 (1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980).
24. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
1980). The Reed I rule was criticized because it required proof of the removal-method technology existing at various times in the past. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 181-82 (1977)
(Daniel, J., dissenting) (difficult or impossible burden where ancient instruments involved); see
also Note, Mines and Minerals - Mineral Reservation - Reed v. Wylie, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J.
624, 628, 632 (1978) (onerous burden leading to uncertainty because title depends upon expert
testimony and jury findings of facts at distant dates). This rule was also questioned because it
overlooked the possibility that a surface-destructive and a non-surface-destructive method of
removing a particular substance might have existed at the same time in the past. See Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1977) (Greenhill, C. J., concurring). A strong judicial affinity for surface protection is reflected in two cases which applied Reed I. Compare Sheffield v.
Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no
writ) (coal and lignite not minerals because exception of sand, gravel, and stone from reservation of "all of the minerals and mineral rights" does not show clear intent to include other
substances removable by surface-destructive methods) with Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch
Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 196-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (coal and lignite
not within "all of the oil, gas, uranium, and other minerals and gravl" even though this
reservation specifically includes substances which could be extracted only by strip-mining).
25. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977) (proof required for summary
judgment on ownership issue), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); see also Reed v. Wylie,
597 S.W.2d 743, 745-46 (Tex. 1980) (discussing Reed I "at the surface" language).
26. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 746-48 (Tex. 1980). In Reed I, the supreme court
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estate and surface estate owners, at the time the estates were severed, was to
preserve the surface of the land, then they intended to preserve the surface in
the future as well. 2 Accordingly, a new rule was announced vesting title to
near-surface coal, lignite, or iron ore in the surface estate owner if the surface estate owner proves that any reasonable removal method will result in
the destruction of the surface.2 Under Reed I, the surface estate owner can
avoid the application of the above test, and establish title, by summary judgment proof that the substance is deposited at the surface of his tract of
land.29

remanded the case to the trial court because the record did not contain the location of the
lignite. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
1980).
27. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980). This conclusion was in response
to the holding in Reed I that the critical time for deciding if the surface would have been
destroyed was the date on which the instrument was executed. See id. at 747. The court
reasoned that the Reed I rule might yield inconsistent outcomes based on the quality of expert
testimony concerning past removal methods. See id. at 747.
28. See id. at 747. Unlike Reed I, Reed H does not require that the degree of technological development be ascertained at any specific point in time. Compare id. at 747 (removal
methods evaluated as of time of conveyance or later) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172
(Tex. 1977) (removal methods at date of conveyance evaluated), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980); see also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 n.3 (Tex. 1984)
(Reed II time frame for evaluating removal methods is conveyance date or thereafter). Reed I
overrules the portion of Reed I which required the surface estate owner to prove that the
substance could only be removed by surface-destructive methods. See Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980). The modifications in Reed HI favored the surface estate owner
because they lessened the burden of proof needed to exclude a particular substance from a
grant of minerals. Compare id. at 747 (substance belongs to surface estate if any reasonable
surface-destructive removal method exists at date of execution or thereafter) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (substance belongs to surface estate if only surface-destructive methods of removal exist at date of execution), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
Reed H clarifies the Reed I requirement that the substance be deposited near the surface. See
Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (substance is near-surface as matter of law if
within 200 feet of surface). Additionally, the court indicates that the surface destruction test
can be applied if the surface estate owner proves that the substance is deposited at or near the
surface of either his tract of land or adjacent land located within the "reasonably immediate
vicinity." See id. at 748. Under Reed HI, if the surface estate owner establishes ownership of a
substance near the surface, then he owns that substance at all depths under the land. See id. at
748. The Reed HI formulation of the surface destruction test has been applied in three cases.
See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (coal and lignite held to
belong to surface estate owner); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985)
(uranium not included in "oil, gas and other minerals"); Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,
601 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980) (uranium included in "oil, gas and
other minerals" because only reasonable method shown was solution mining which did not
destroy surface), aff'd on other grounds, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
29. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980). The court defined "at the surface" as on the surface or at a shallow depth beneath the surface. See id. at 746. Applying the
definition, the court found as a matter of law that the surface estate owner in Reed had estab-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:185

While the supreme court focused on maintaining the integrity of the surface estate, 3 ° concern for the stabilization of Texas mineral titles grew with
continued use of the surface destruction test.3 1 One supreme court justice
warned that the surface destruction test spawned tract-by-tract litigation
which would lead to uncertainties in title ownership. 32 Another justice
feared that the factual inquiries accompanying the surface destruction test
would destabilize land titles and impede the development of crucial energy
sources.3 3 Both justices urged that ownership disputes be resolved by examining the instrument alone, without reference to factual investigations.34

lished that the lignite was deposited at the surface. See id. at 746. Therefore, the surface estate
owner owned the lignite without application of the surface destruction test. See id. at 746. A
surface estate owner satisfying the summary judgment test owns the substance at all depths
under the land. See id. at 748.
30. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (Acker,
Reed I, Reed II part of court's attempt to protect surface estate); Friendswood Dev. Co. v.
Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc. 576 S.W.2d 21, 33 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting) (Acker part
of trend to avoid destruction of surface estate); Note, Mines and Minerals - Title to Minerals
- Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 477, 488 & n.66 (1984) (Acker, Reed
I, Reed II reflect concern for surface owner).
31. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (application of surface destruction rule caused title uncertainty); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747
(Tex. 1980) (Reed I rule had unstabilizing effect on land titles); id. at 750 (Spears, J., concurring) (ownership uncertainty existed under Acker and Reed I decisions).
32. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 178 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting). The
following statement epitomizes Justice Daniel's opposition to the surface destruction test:
"[land titles will be decided more by inspection for near-surface out-croppings and proof of
the necessary method of producing the substance at the time of the deed or lease than by
reading the instruments of conveyance or lease." See id. at 178. Justice Daniel recommended
that "other minerals" should not include coal and lignite. See id. at 175; see also Reed v.
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (discusses merits of Justice
Daniel's recommendation). However, Justice Daniel limited his reasoning to situations where
the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals" is used. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 177 (Tex.
1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
33. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring). Justice
Spears identified several fact findings that would have to be made before ownership could be
determined under the surface destruction test, including whether the removal method is reasonable and whether the substance lies near the surface. See id. at 750. For an example of the
numerous special issues and jury findings involved in the application of the surface destruction
test, see Storm Assocs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 582 & n. 1 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982), affid sub nom., Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
34. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750, 751 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring);
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 179 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting); see also Comment,
The Need for Certainty in Ownership of Minerals: Coal, Lignite, "and Other Minerals" 22 S.
TEX. L.J. 287, 288 (1982) (determining title from instrument alone imperative for efficient
development of resources). Justice Spears discussed four alternative methods for determining
ownership of unnamed substances, all of which would lend more certainty to Texas mineral
titles in his opinion. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring). The four alternatives include: (1) separate the issues of ownership and reasonable
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III.

MOSER V UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.

In Moser v. United States Steel Corp. (Moser II), " the Supreme Court of
Texas was confronted with a fact situation which demanded that the emerging conflict between title certainty and surface protection be addressed.3 6 In
Moser II, the mineral and surface estates were severed by a 1949 deed reserving "all of the oil, gas, and other minerals." 37 The owners of the mineral
estate claimed that uranium was included in the reservation of "other minerals."3 Recognizing that the surface destruction test had caused title uncertainty, 39 the court redefined minerals as "all substances within the ordinary
and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or value is known
at the time of severance." ' The court then applied this test and concluded

surface use and construe "minerals" according to its normal meaning; (2) coal and lignite at all
depths belong to surface estate unless the instrument affirmatively expresses a contrary intention; (3) coal and lignite not included in "other minerals;" and (4) mineral owner only entitled
to substances extractible by wells or shafts. See id. at 750-51 (Spears, J., concurring). For a
brief evaluation of each alternative, see generally Note, Ownership of "OtherMinerals":Reed v.
Wylie Speaks Again, 18 Hous. L. REV. 201, 208-09 (1980).
35. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). The supreme court issued an earlier opinion in this case
which was withdrawn. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8,
1983), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
36. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1984) (court construing "oil, gas and other minerals" reservation to determine uranium ownership).
37. See id. at 100.
38. See id. at 100.
39. See id. at 101. The court also recognized that the factual resolutions required in the
application of the surface destruction test made it impossible to determine ownership of an
unspecified substance from the language of the instrument alone. See id. at 101.
40. See id. at 102. It should be noted that the Moser ordinary meaning test is different
than the Heinatz v. Allen ordinary meaning test. Compare id. at 102 (knowledge of presence or
value of substance at time of severance irrelevant) with Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518,
217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (substance not within ordinary meaning unless rare or peculiarly
valuable); see also Note, Abandonment of the Surface Destruction Test in Determining Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 699,
711 (1984) (Heinatz substantive value factor irrelevant to Moser ordinary meaning test). Early
Texas courts had used the constructional aid ejusdem generisto limit the general word "minerals" to substances of the same physical character as those specifically listed before the general
word "minerals" in the grant or reservation clause. See Guinn v. Acker, 451 S.W.2d 549, 55256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970) (discussing history of ejusdem generis doctrine in Texas),
affid on other groundssub nom., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. 1971) (supreme
court refuses to apply ejusdem generis doctrine). While the supreme court did not expressly
abolish the ejusdem generis rule, the rule is implicitly rejected by the ordinary meaning test
adopted in Moser. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.
1984) (hard substance uranium within ordinary meaning of minerals from an "oil, gas and
other minerals" clause) with Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106
Tex. 94, 103, 157 S.W. 737, 739-40 (1913) (oil excluded because specific words "timber, earth,
and stone" restrict general word "mineral" that follows to substances similar to timber, earth,
and stone).
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that uranium is within the ordinary and natural meaning of minerals.4"
Therefore, title to uranium was held to belong to the owners of the mineral
estate as a matter of law.42
The Moser II decision represents a compromise between two major goals:
(1) providing mineral title certainty;4 3 and (2) protecting those who had relied on the surface destruction tests." Although a departure from the surface destruction era was essential to achieve mineral title certainty, 45 the
court believed equity and the principle of stare decisis dictated that parties
relying on the Acker and Reed holdings be protected.4 6 As a solution to the
dilemma, the supreme court adopted the ordinary meaning test to eliminate
title uncertainty, 47 but limited the ordinary meaning test to a prospective

41. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984).
42. See id. at 101-02.
43. See id. at 101 (court recognizes need to depart from surface destruction ownership
approach which caused title uncertainty). Devising a test which would facilitate mineral ownership determinations from the instrument alone was a subgoal which is closely related and
essential to providing mineral title certainty. See id. at 101 (citing Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d
743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring)).
44. See id. at 103; see also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430
(June 8, 1983) (rights acquired under surface destruction holdings should be respected), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). Moser II reflects a stronger desire than Moser I to
protect parties who relied on the Acker and Reed decisions. Compare Moser v. United States
Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) ("[b]ecause of the extent of public reliance" on
Acker and Reed) (emphasis added) and id. at 103 (ordinary meaning rule limited to prospective application) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8,
1983) ("[b]ecause contracting parties reasonably could have relied" on Acker and Reed) (emphasis added), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) and id. at 430 (surface destruction tests apply only to instruments executed between Acker and June 8, 1983).
45. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
46. See id. at 103; see also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430
(June 8, 1983) (equity compels holding that surface destruction tests apply to instruments
executed between Acker and June 8, 1983), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984);
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 28-29 (Tex. 1978)
(stare decisis doctrine mandates respect for prior decisions which established rules involving
property rights). The dilemma faced by the supreme court in Moser is closely analogous to the
situation which faced the court in Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc. In
Friendswood, the court recognized that the common law rule, which afforded producers immunity for subsidence caused by the negligent withdrawal of groundwater, was outmoded and
contrary to public interests because it provided no incentive to conserve water or to avoid
damaging neighboring land. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576
S.W.2d 21, 28-29 (Tex. 1978). However, many citizens had acquired property rights and
drilled water wells under the established rule which imposed liability only for malicious water
withdrawal. See id. at 29. Consequently, the court announced a new rule which expanded the
old rules of liability to include negligently caused subsidence, but the new rule would only
apply prospectively to groundwater withdrawals from wells drilled or produced after the date
of the opinion. See id. at 30.
47. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101-102 (Tex. 1984).
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application.4 8 This element of compromise, however, has undermined the
court's goal of promoting title certainty.
IV.

THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF MOSER

Although the supreme court recites that the surface destruction test is
abandoned, 49 the language of Moser II indicates that this test is still operative.5" Moser II contains sources for restricting the application of the ordinary meaning test in three areas: time," substances, 52 and the wording of
the clause being construed.5 3
A.

When to Apply the Ordinary Meaning Test: The Timing Limitation

1. Prospective Application
In Moser II, the supreme court announced that the ordinary meaning test

is "to be applied only prospectively from . . . June 8, 1983.""4 The word

"prospectively" created a chronological division in Texas mineral ownership

48. See id. at 103 (ordinary meaning rule applies only prospectively because of public
reliance on Acker and Reed). As additional justification for limiting the holding to a prospective application, the court reasoned that the public could not foresee this sudden change in
ownership tests. See id. at 103; see also Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983)
(noting exception to general rule of retrospective operation of supreme court decisions based
upon extent of public reliance on old rule and inability to foresee adoption of new rule).
49. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
50. See id. at 101 ("[w]e now abandon, in the case of uranium, the Acker and Reed approach to determining ownership of 'other minerals' ") (emphasis added); id. at 102 ("[w]e
continue to adhere . . . to . . .[Reed II]"); id. at 103 (ordinary meaning rule limited to prospective application because of "extent of public reliance on ... [Acker and Reed holdings]");
see also Note, Determinationof Ownership ofNear-Surface Mineralsas a Matterof Law: Moser
v. U. S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 725-26 (1984) (examines Moser II language and concludes that surface destruction test still applicable to conveyances made before June 8, 1983).
51. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary
meaning rule applies only prospectively from June 8, 1983) (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 102 (list of substances from prior decisions will belong to surface estate even
when Moser II applies); see also Recent Development, 19 TULSA L.J. 448, 455 (1984) (certain
substances belong to surface estate without application of Moser ordinary meaning test).
53. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) ("a severance
of minerals in an oil, gas and other mineralsclause includes all substances within the ordinary
and natural meaning of that word") (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 103. It should be noted that the prospective operation of a newly announced rule may have significantly different meanings and consequences in tort actions than
in cases involving property rights. See Frien swood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc.,
576 S.W.2d 21, 30-31 (Tex. 1978) (distinctions due to importance of precedent in property
law). The supreme court has reached different results on whether to apply a new rule of
property law to the case which announces the rule. Compare Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary meaning rule announced and applied) with
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978) (rule
for subsidence caused by ground water withdrawal announced but not applied).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:185

law." However, Moser II did not specify what event must occur after June
8, 1983 to trigger the application of the ordinary meaning test. 6 Three possible events which might have activated the Moser II ordinary meaning test
were: (1) a severance of "oil, gas and other minerals" occurring after June 8,
1983;17 (2) a mineral transaction entered into after June 8, 1983 by a mineral
estate owner relying upon Moser II's classification of uranium as a mineral;58
or (3) a trial beginning after June 8, 1983."9
The supreme court clarified the "prospectively" language from Moser II in
Friedman v. Texaco, Inc. " In Friedman, Justice Spears stated that the new
Moser II rules will only be triggered by severances of "other minerals"
which occur after June 8, 1983.61 The Moser H rules affecting only post-

55. Cf Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc. 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex.
1978) (chronological division in ground water subsidence law created because court adhered to
common law immunity rule for subsidence occurring before decision date and announced new
rule which would be triggered by subsidence occurring after decision date).
56. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (court merely
announces new rules apply prospectively from June 8, 1983).
57. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) ("a
severance of minerals in an oil, gas and other minerals clause includes all substances within the
ordinary and natural meaning of that word") (emphasis added) with id.at 103 ("rules announced in this case . . .[apply] only prospectively from . . .June 8, 1983").
58. Cf Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 328-29, 249
S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (1952) (supreme court applied law existing at time of reliance on decisions
concerning pooled lease production to extend original mineral interest grant).
59. See Thornal v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978)
(Keith, J., dissenting) (prospective means application "to trials held after the announcement of
the decision"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam. 587 S.W.2d 384, 384 (Tex. 1979)
(agreeing with Justice Keith that new supreme court rule does not control disposition because
trial arose before decision announcing new rule).
60. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985).
61. See id. at 589. Announcing that the Moser II rules apply only to severances made
after June 8, 1983 is inconsistent with the court's application of the ordinary meaning test in
Moser I. Compare id. at 589 (Moser II rules apply to "other minerals" severances made after
June 8, 1983) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (court
applied ordinary meaning rule to 1949 severance of "other minerals"); see also Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law: Moser v. U. S. Steel, 36
BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 729 (1984) (notes Moser H court applied ordinary meaning test to 1949
conveyance and concludes ordinary meaning test applies to uranium in all conveyances of
"other minerals"). One explanation for the inconsistency is that the prospective limitation did
not apply in Moser I because the court was simply applying the new rule to the parties in the
present cause. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1964) (application of new rule
to present cause just precludes pure prospectivity); Friendswood Dev. Co, v. Smith-Southwest
Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 35 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting) (noting prior Texas decisions
where a new rule was announced and applied, and arguing new prospective subsidence rule
should apply to parties before court). But see Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978) (new property rule rarely applied in case announcing
new rule); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 104 (Tex. 1984) (Ray, J., dis-
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June 8, 1983 severances include the ordinary meaning test,6 2 and the rule
requiring the mineral owner to compensate the surface owner for any surface
destruction.6 3
2.

Retrospective Application

In Moser H, the supreme court gave no indication of the law that should
64
be applied retrospectively when the ordinary meaning test is not triggered.
Friedman, however, clearly establishes that Moser H rules will not apply to
severances made before June 8, 1983.65
After Friedman, June 8, 1983 becomes the critical dividing line in Texas
mineral ownership jurisprudence with respect to uranium.6 6 For uranium,
the Moser H ordinary meaning test controls severances of "other minerals"
occurring after June 8, 1983, and Acker and Reed govern severances of

senting) (court announced new rule requiring compensation for surface destruction but did not
apply it).
62. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984).
63. See id. at 103 (mineral owner acquiring title to an unnamed substance under a severance of "other minerals" must compensate surface owner for surface damage caused during
removal of the substance).
64. See id. at 103 (court merely announces that the ordinary meaning test applies only
prospectively because of public reliance on the Acker and Reed holdings). Therefore, it was
possible that the common law ownership approaches would remain intact so that the exact law
in effect at the time of the severance or at the time of reliance on a subsequent change in the
law could be applied. Cf Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d
21, 22 (Tex. 1978) (new property rule adopted prospectively, but old common law rule applies
to actions taken before the announcement of the new rule); Note, Determination of Ownership
of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law: Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715,
725-26 (1984) (discussing Moser H prospective language and stating that arguably a test other
than the surface destruction test should control pre-Acker conveyances). The Moser If prospective language could also have been interpreted as meaning that the ordinary meaning test
would apply in cases which did not involve reliance on Acker and Reed. See Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary meaning test applies prospectively because of public reliance on the Acker and Reed holdings); see also Note, Determination
of Ownership of Near-Surface Mineralsas a Matterof Law: Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L.
REV. 715, 726 (1984) (Moser H prospective language could create a twelve-year surface destruction "window" because parties to pre-Acker conveyances did not rely on Acker and Reed).
Finally, it was possible that the law in effect retroactively immediately prior to June 8, 1983
would continue to control ownership disputes arising from conveyances made before June 8,
1983. See Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law:
Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 726 (1984); cf. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. SmithSouthwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex. 1978) (old common law rule applies to actions
taken before new rule announced).
65. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (Moser HI rules apply
only to severances made after June 8, 1983).
66. See id. at 589 (ordinary meaning test applies to post-June 8, 1983 severances and
surface destruction test applies to pre-June 8, 1983 severances when title to uranium is
involved).
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"other minerals" occurring before June 8, 1983.67 Consequently, many
years of "other minerals" severances are locked in time 68 so that title to
uranium for all pre-June 8, 1983 severances can be safely determined only in
the courtroom and not by an examination of the language in the severing
instrument.69 Furthermore, depending upon the severance date, two definitions of the word "minerals" will be applied to uranium. 7' Applying more
than one definition clearly creates further title uncertainty since uranium is
71
encompassed by one definition yet may not be covered by the other.

67. See id, at 589. The decision to apply Acker and Reed to uranium for all pre-June 8,
1983 severances was prompted by three considerations: (1) the court concluded that Texas law
for determining uranium ownership was unsettled prior to Acker; (2) the court viewed Heinatz
as the origin of the surface destruction test; and (3) the Acker and Reed holdings were not
limited to a prospective application. See id. at 588-89. But see Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
517-18, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997-98 (1949) ("mineral rights" given an ordinary and natural construction and the surface destruction factor de-emphasized); Note, Determinationof Ownership
of Near-Surface Mineralsas a Matter of Law: Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715,
725 (1984) (surface destruction test created in Acker); Note, Mines and Minerals - Mineral
Reservation - Reed v. Wylie, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 580, 595 (1980) (Acker disregarded the
Heinatz natural meaning and value factors). In Friedman, the mineral estate owner argued
that the applicable law should be the law that was in effect when she made a conveyance after
the severance. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985). The court
rejected the reliance argument concluding that no clear rule existed for uranium prior to
Acker. See id. at 589. The language in Friedman indicates that a similar reliance argument
might prevail for substances other than uranium if the relying party can establish that a clear
rule existed at the time of the reliance. Cf id. at 589 (reliance argument rejected because no
clear rule for uranium existed at the time of the reliance).
68. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Acker and Reed
apply to all "other minerals" severances occurring before June 8, 1983). The time lock can be
avoided if the mineral and surface estates severed before June 8, 1983 are merged and then resevered after June 8, 1983. See id. at 589; see also Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113
Tex. 247, 260-62, 254 S.W. 296, 301-02 (1923) (discussing principles of merger for severed
mineral and surface estates).
69. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting);
see also Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (Reed H rule
does not facilitate title determinations from instrument alone, but guarantees decades of
litigation).
70. Compare Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (Moser H applies to severances made after June 8, 1983) and id. at 589 (Acker and Reed control severances
made before June 8, 1983) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.
1984) (mineral defined as a substance within natural and ordinary meaning of the word "minerals") and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (mineral defined as a substance
removable without substantial adverse effect on surface); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.,
691 S.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (opposing majority's rule because
uranium ownership depends upon severance date).
71. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (uranium a mineral within natural and ordinary meaning of "minerals") with Friedman v. Texaco,
Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (uranium not a mineral based on application of Acker
and Reed rules).
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The supreme court's recent opinion in Schwarz v. State72 also indicates
that the ordinary and natural meaning test is further restricted since the
surface destruction test was not abandoned in Moser H1 for near-surface coal,
lignite, and iron ore.73 The Acker and Reed surface destruction rules will
continue to apply to severances of "other minerals" made before and after
June 8, 1983 where the ownership of near-surface coal, lignite, or iron ore is
disputed. 4
Friedman and Schwarz guarantee that the surface destruction test survives
to haunt contracting parties, title examiners, and courts, with its unpredictable maze of factual inquiries, where title to uranium, near-surface coal,

near-surface lignite, or near-surface iron ore is concerned.7 5 However, the
applicable retrospective law for substances other than uranium, near-surface
coal, near-surface lignite, and near-surface iron ore is still not clear.76 As an
example, a future dispute may arise out of a pre-June 8, 1983 severance over
unnamed substance X. Presumably, the rules of Acker and Reed will determine the ownership of substance X since the Moser II timing limitation prevents the application of the ordinary meaning test. 77 Arguably, however,
Texas courts may follow a clear classifying rule for substance X, which existed when a mineral conveyance was made before June 8, 1983, rather than

72. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12, 1985).
73. See id. at 489; see also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.
1984) (Acker and Reed abandoned "in the case of uranium").
74. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (stating that Moser
II abandoned Acker and Reed for uranium, and reaffirming the application of Acker and Reed
for near-surface lignite, iron, and coal).
75. See id. at 489 (Acker and Reed reaffirmed for near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore);
Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Acker and Reed apply to uranium
for severances occurring before June 8, 1983); see also Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 752
(Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (characterizing the surface destruction test as a "mire of
factual differences" promoting tract-by-tract ownership determinations).
76. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (establishing the
applicable law only for near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (establishing the applicable law only for uranium). It should be
noted, however, that Moser H1 vests title to sand, gravel, water, caliche, surface shale, limestone, and building stone in the surface estate owner as a matter of law, regardless of when the
severance occurred. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984);
see also Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (under Moser II, certain
substances part of surface estate as a matter of law). Moser II also vests title to solid sulphur in
the mineral estate owner as a matter of law. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (solid sulphur catalogued mineral as a matter of law).
77. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Acker and Reed had
retroactive operation); id. at 489 (Moser II applies only to severances occurring after June 8,
1983, Acker and Reed apply to all other severances where title to uranium involved); Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary meaning test applies only
prospectively because of public reliance on Acker and Reed).
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the surface destruction test.7 8
B.

Substances Limitation
1. Substances Belonging to the Surface Estate as a Matter of Law

Although all substances are potentially subject to classification under the
Moser H ordinary meaning test,' 9 the supreme court has at least temporarily
removed certain substances from the spectrum of substances which can be
classified by the test.80 As a matter of law, limestone, building stone, caliche, surface shale, water, sand, and gravel belong to the surface estate under
all severances of "other minerals." 8 Apparently, the statements in Moser H
that near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore are included in the surface estate

78. Cf Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) (state may
adhere to precedent so that overruled decisions remain the law for past transactions); Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8, 1983) (rights acquired under
previously existing law should be respected by applying the effective law at the time of reliance), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30-31 (Tex. 1978) (for property transactions, "parties should
be able to rely on the law which existed at the time of their actions"). Where property rights
have accrued under a settled state rule, federal courts may apply the settled rule to those rights
even if the state court changes the law after the rights accrued. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U.S. 349, 360 (1910). The argument to apply a rule existing at the time of reliance
prior to Acker has only been foreclosed by the supreme court for uranium. See Friedman v.
Texaco, Inc., 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 455, 456 (June 5, 1985) (no settled rule existed for uranium
before Acker).
79. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (minerals
"includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word") (emphasis
added). But see Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of
Law: Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 727, 729, 731 (1984) (ordinary meaning
test applies only to uranium).
80. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (court will
continue to adhere to list of prior decisions holding certain substances part of surface estate as
matter of law). The court's list of previous decisions includes: Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980) (near-surface lignite, coal, and iron); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d
994 (1949) (limestone and building stone); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (surface shale, limestone, and caliche); Fleming Found.
v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (water);
Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ refd) (sand and
gravel).
81. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984); see also
Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (Moser H vests title to certain
substances in surface estate owner as a matter of law). By adhering to prior holdings which
classified particular substances as "surface," the supreme court has effectively adopted a construction of "the ordinary and natural meaning" of minerals very similar to that advocated by
Justice Daniel in his dissenting opinion in Reed L Compare Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (near surface lignite, coal, and iron, limestone, shale,
caliche, water, sand, and gravel belong to surface estate) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169,
182 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (near surface lignite, iron ore, limestone, sand, and
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as a matter of law were not meant to be literally interpreted. 2 Rather, the
court was merely emphasizing that the Acker and Reed rules would continue
to be applied in determining title to near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore. 3
2.

Substances Belonging to the Mineral Estate as a Matter of Law

As a matter of law, solid sulphur is a mineral under all severances of
"other minerals." 84 Uranium is a mineral as a matter of law only for "other
minerals" severances occurring after June 8, 1983.85
3.

Substances Included in the Ordinary Meaning of Minerals

Uranium is the only substance which has been classified as a matter of law
under the Moser H1 ordinary meaning test.8 6 Therefore, the supreme court
has at least temporarily created a separate body of law for uranium. 7 When
Texas courts apply the Moser II ordinary meaning test to substances other

gravel not within ordinary and natural meaning of minerals because of their close physical
relationship to the soil).
82. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (the coal and
lignite was near-surface, but the court still applied the Reed II surface destruction test) with
Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101, 102 (Tex. 1984) (near-surface coal,
lignite, and iron ore are included in surface estate as a matter of law).
83. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985).
84. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (indicating
that solid sulphur has already been catalogued a mineral as a matter of law).
85. Compare Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Moser II rules
only apply to severances made after June 8, 1983) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 101-02 (Tex. 1984) (uranium within natural meaning of minerals and is owned by
mineral estate owner as a matter of law).
86. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101-02 (Tex. 1984).
87. Interview with James N. Castleberry, Jr., Dean of the St. Mary's University School of
Law, in San Antonio, Texas (May 27, 1985) (court has probably created separate body of law
for uranium because of restrictions on ordinary meaning test); see also Schwarz v. State, 28
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (Moser II abandoned Acker and Reed for uranium
title determinations); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) ("we
now abandon, in the case of uranium, the Acker and Reed [ownership] approach") (emphasis
added); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219, at 266.11 (1984) (Acker and
Reed intact for substances other than uranium after Moser II). Justice Campbell, who wrote
the Moser opinion, indicated in another case that rules governing hard minerals should be
different from rules governing substances related to oil and gas because the mining of hard
minerals involves different problems. See Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Cleghorn, 623 S.W.2d
310, 312 (Tex. 1981) (Campbell, J., concurring) (implied oil and gas lease covenants not applicable to hard minerals). The supreme court may have perceived a greater need to protect the
surface estate when coal and lignite are involved than when uranium is involved even though
all three substances are hard minerals. Compare Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983) (coal and lignite strip-mining destroyed surface), rev'd on other grounds,
28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12, 1985) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d
731, 733-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980) (uranium solution mining does not destroy surface), affid on other grounds, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
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than uranium, the inclusion or exclusion of unnamed substances in the word
"minerals" will be determined according to the "ordinary and natural meaning of that word." 8 Prior case law may offer some guidance in determining
what substances are within the ordinary and natural meaning of minerals.89
Oil, gas, coal, and lignite are all substances that have been determined to be
included in a conveyance or reservation of minerals.9"

88. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (minerals
"includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word"). Several
courts have attempted to capture a standard of knowledge to be used for the ordinary meaning
of the word "minerals." See, e.g., New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767,
771 (D.N.M. 1956) ("scientific, geological and practical meanings"), dism'd sub nom., Elkins
v. New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co., 239 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1958); Fleming Found. v. Texaco,

Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("true test is what
that word means in the vernacular of mining and mineral industry, the commercial world, and
the land owners"); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947,
writ ref'd) (substances "commonly regarded as minerals" within "common vernacular of those
dealing in farm lands and mineral rights"). At the trial court level, the "ordinary and natural
meaning" of the word "minerals" will probably be a fact question. See Recent Development,
19 TULSA L.J. 448, 453 (1984) (ordinary meaning a question of fact requiring expert testimony
in mining, commercial, and agricultural fields); see also Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 182
(Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (ordinary and natural meaning depends upon substance
location, removal methods, and production effects on surface); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997-98 (1949) (ordinary and natural meaning depends upon substance
value, location, removal methods, and surface-destructive effects). It has been suggested that
the key factor for determining whether a substance is ordinarily considered part of the surface
or part of the mineral estate is the substance's close physical relationship with the soil. See
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 181-82 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting); see also Robinson
v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Inc., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Tex. 1973) (water closely related to
surface and ordinarily considered part of surface estate); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518,
217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (limestone ordinarily considered part of soil because of close relation to soil).
89. See Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983) (court considered prior case and statute in determining that coal and lignite within ordinary meaning of
minerals), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12, 1985); Recent Development, 19 TULSA L.J.
448, 453 (1984) (suggesting that decisions between Heinatz and Acker offer best indication of
Moser ordinary meaning test application). While prior holdings may be helpful, it should be
noted that substances included within the Moser II ordinary meaning test may not have been
included within the Heinatz ordinary meaning test. Compare Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (knowledge of value of substance at time of severance
irrelevant) with Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (substance
not within ordinary meaning unless rare or peculiarly valuable). In Moser I, the court announced adherence to five prior decisions. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d
99, 102 (Tex. 1984). Of the five decisions, Reed H is the only one in which the court did not
consider whether the substance is commonly viewed as a mineral. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147
Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ret'd n.r.e.); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846,
852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658,
660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref d).
90. See Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1983) (coal and lig-
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The supreme court, therefore, may decide to apply the Moser II ordinary
meaning test to coal and lignite in the future. 9 Mineral estate owners would
have a strong argument if the ordinary meaning test is applied to coal and
lignite, because the weight of Texas authority supports the view that coal
and lignite are encompassed within the ordinary meaning of minerals.9 2 In
fact, the supreme court has recognized that coal and lignite would belong to
the mineral estate under a reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals" if not
for the application of the surface destruction test. 93 If the court does classify
coal and lignite as minerals under the ordinary meaning test, another chronological division in Texas mineral ownership law will arise for coal and
lignite. 94

nite within ordinary meaning of minerals), rev'd on other grounds, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491
(June 12, 1985) (coal and lignite not minerals based on application of surface destruction test);
Carminati v. Fenoglio, 267 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (oil and gas within "all minerals" reservation); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096, 1096
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref d) ("all the coal and mineral" reservation covers
oil and gas). Texas courts have at different times split as to whether salt water is part of the
mineral estate. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Inc., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex.
1973) (all salt and fresh water belongs to surface estate); Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson,
384 S.W.2d 752, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd n.r.e.) (salt water included as
mineral within "oil, gas and other minerals" lease).
91. See Note, Determinationof Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law:
Moser v. U S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 730 (1984); see also Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ordinary meaning rule applies prospectively from June
8, 1983). However, the court has already declined to apply the ordinary meaning test in a case
involving coal and lignite decided after Moser I. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488,
491 (June 12, 1985) (court applied surface destruction test).
92. See, e.g., Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983) (coal and
lignite within ordinary meaning of minerals), rev'd on other grounds, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488,
491 (June 12, 1985) (coal and lignite not minerals based on application of Reed II); Cline v.
Henry, 239 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ refd n.r.e.) (coal and lignite
are minerals); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test and
More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 904 (1977) (ordinary and normal meaning of minerals would
include coal). All of the judicial authority in Texas that coal and lignite are not minerals is
based upon applications of the surface destruction test. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744-46 (Tex. 1980); Sheffield v.
Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ);
Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.); DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, 1977, no writ);
Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
93. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
1980); see also Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (coal and lignite generally recognized as minerals within
"other minerals" without surface destruction rule application). Similarly, the supreme court
recognized that iron ore is a mineral, but it belongs to the surface estate under the surface
destruction test because its removal would destroy the surface of the land. See Acker v.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971).
94. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (Acker and
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C. The Limitation Based on Wording Used to Grant or Reserve Minerals
The "oil, gas and other minerals" clause is most commonly used to grant
or reserve minerals in Texas." Many instruments, however, contain mineral
clauses that are worded differently. 96 Literally interpreted, Moser II limits
the application of the ordinary meaning test to cases construing the word
"minerals" from an "oil, gas and other minerals" clause.97 Historically,
Texas courts have considered the exact language used when adjusting the
scope of the mineral estate. 98 One supreme court justice has even suggested
Reed reaffirmed for near-surface coal and lignite) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 101-03 (Tex. 1984) (because of reliance on Acker and Reed, surface destruction test
abandoned for uranium only prospectively from June 8, 1983); see also Note, Determinationof
Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law: Moser v. U. S. Steel 36 BAYLOR L.
REV. 715, 730 (1984) (if ordinary meaning test is applied to coal and lignite in future, court
will again face problem of how to protect reliance on surface destruction tests).
95. See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. 1971) ("oil, gas and other minerals" reservation widely used in Texas deeds); Note, Abandonment of the Surface Destruction
Test in Determining Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15
TEx. TECH L. REV. 699, 701 (1984) (mineral and surface estates usually severed by "oil, gas
and other minerals" clause); Note, Ownership of "Other Minerals".: Reed v. Wylie Speaks
Again, 18 Hous. L. REV. 201, 201 (1980) (most mineral transactions use "oil, gas and other
minerals").
96. See, e.g., Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 515, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1949) ("the
mineral rights"); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 575, 136 S.W.2d
800, 802 (1940) ("all Minerells Paint Rock, &c"); Watkins v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., 231
S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ) ("all of the gypsum, gypsum plaster and gypsum stone and all other minerals").
97. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) ("a severance
of minerals in an oil, gas and other mineralsclause includes all substances within the ordinary
and natural meaning of that word") (emphasis added). In Acker, Reed, and Moser, the
supreme court construed the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals." See id. at 100; Reed v.
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971). It
should be noted, however, that the rule announced in Acker was clearly not restricted to the
specific phrase "oil, gas and other minerals." See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.
1971) (rule applies to construction of "minerals" or "mineral rights"). Arguably, the ordinary
meaning test is not limited to the specific phrase "oil, gas and other minerals" because neither
of the cases that the court cites as support for the new test construed the phrase. See Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (citing Heinatz and Cain below the
statement of the ordinary meaning test); see also Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217
S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) ("the mineral rights" construed); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915,
922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ) ("all of the oil, gas, coal and other minerals"
construed).
98. See, e.g., Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing instruments which reserve "oil, gas, a dissimilar mineral, and other minerals"); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (named substances oil and gas not similar to
water, so water not part of mineral estate); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ) (emphasizing word "all" in a grant of "all of the oil, gas,
coal and other minerals" reveals intent to make an unrestricted grant of all minerals).
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that a broad, unrestricted mineral clause may encompass more substances
than an "oil, gas and other minerals" clause. 99 Future judicial applications
of Moser II should indicate whether the supreme court has made a further
division in Texas mineral ownership law based on semantical differences in
mineral clauses. 1° A broad application of the ordinary meaning test to
clauses worded differently than "oil, gas and other minerals" will however
best serve the policy of mineral title certainty.
V.

THE LAW TO APPLY WHEN MOSER IS NOT APPLICABLE

The supreme court's decisions in Friedman and Schwarz establish that the
Acker and Reed rules apply, at least in certain instances, when the ordinary
meaning test is not applicable.10 1 But what are the exact "rules" from Acker
and Reed that should be applied?
Four guidelines emerge from an examination of the Moser I, Friedman
and Schwarz opinions. First, Reed H is viewed as the final evolved statement
of the surface destruction test. 102 Second, the court will apparently give the
Reed II surface destruction test blanket application without making exceptions for specific reliance on other versions of the test.10 3 Third, the scope of
Reed II is not limited to near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore;'" rather,

99. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 177 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
100. Cf Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983) (court applied
Moser ordinary meaning test to "all the minerals" reservation), rev'd on othergrounds, 28 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (court applied surface destruction test in construing "all
the minerals").
101. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (Acker and Reed
reaffirmed for determining title to near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore since Moser II is not
yet applicable to those substances); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985)
(Acker and Reed determine title to uranium for severances before June 8, 1983 since Moser II
is only applicable to severances after June 8, 1983).
102. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Reed II is an extension of the Acker surface destruction rule).
103. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489-91 (June 12, 1985) (Reed II applied even though surface estate owner specifically leased coal and lignite mining rights in 1978
when Reed I was operative); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. 1985)
(court followed jury findings based on Reed II even though surface estate owner had specifically leased uranium mining rights in 1977 when Reed I was in effect). The language in Moser
II also indicates that the Reed I surface destruction test should not be applied. See Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (Reed I not cited as part of rationale
for limiting ordinary meaning test to prospective application).
104. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (court follows jury
findings based on Reed II in determining title to uranium); see also Moser v. United States
Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980) (applying Reed II to
uranium deposits within 200 feet of the surface), aff'd on other grounds, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.

1984).
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the scope may approach the "any substance" breadth of Acker. "' Finally,
the "contrary intention" rule from Acker will continue to be applied.' °6
Following these guidelines, the severing instrument should initially be examined to determine if the language discloses a fair, specific, and affirmative
10 7
If
intention to include the surface-destructible substance as a mineral.
this specific intention is expressed by the language of the severing instrument, then the mineral estate owner owns the substance without the application of a surface destruction test. 10 Conversely, if no specific intention is
found in the severing instrument, the presumed general intention to preserve
the surface of the land will be effectuated by an application of the Reed II
surface destruction test.'0 9 Reed II, however, is limited to determining the

105. Compare Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (Reed HI is an
extension of Acker) with Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (a substance which
must be extracted by surface-destructive methods is not a mineral) (emphasis added); see also
DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (under Acker,
any substance which must be removed by surface-destructive methods is not a mineral) (emphasis added).
106. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (court applied the
rule); see also Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (substance removable by
surface-destructive methods not a mineral unless contrary intention is fairly expressed by the
language in the severing instrument).
107. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985). An instrument
may manifest a specific intention in either of two ways: (1) the particular substance is listed in
the grant or reservation of minerals; or (2) the language used affirmatively expresses that the
mineral estate owner may destroy the surface when extracting minerals. See id. at 491; Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Several Texas
courts have discussed language that is or is not sufficient to fairly express an intention to allow
surface destruction. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (expressly reserving minerals at all depths including those extractible by strip-mining clearly expresses intent to allow surface destruction), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Storm Assocs., Inc.
v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 585 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1982) (mere clause providing
payment for some surface damage does not express specific intent to allow surface destruction), af'd sub nom., Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985); Sheffield v. Gibbs
Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ)
(exclusion of sand, gravel, and stone from mineral reservation does not clearly express intention to include coal and lignite removable by surface-destructive methods). A specific intention to include one surface-destructible substance as a mineral does not necessarily reveal a
specific intention to include another. See Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d
193, 196-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (coal and lignite not within "all of
the oil, gas, uranium, and other minerals and gravel" even though the reservation specifically
includes substances extractible only by strip-mining). But see Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169,
172 (Tex. 1977) (including minerals extractible by strip-mining would express clear intent),
modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
108. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985); see also Acker v.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (if a fairly expressed intention is found, a substance
removable by surface-destructive methods should be included as a mineral).
109. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (court applied
Reed H1 to near-surface coal and lignite after finding no specific intent to include the substances
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ownership of a substance found near the surface.1"' Therefore, what is the
applicable law for determining the ownership of a substance deposited only
below the near-surface level? Vesting title to coal, lignite, iron ore, and uranium in the mineral estate owner, when these substances are only deposited
more than two hundred feet below the surface, would not conflict with the
surface-preservation principle underlying Acker and Reed.1 1 '
VI.

SCHWARZ V STATE

The first judicial application of the Moser ordinary meaning test occurred
in the case of Schwarz v. State. 12 The State of Texas issued a patent in 1907

to Schwarz' predecessors in title which reserved to the State "all the minerals."'1 13 In 1978, apparently relying upon the Acker and Reed I holdings,
Schwarz leased the rights to the coal and lignite in the tract to a company
11 4
which subsequently strip-mined the land removing the two substances.
The Austin Court of Appeals applied Moser I and held that the State, as the

as minerals); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (court follows
jury findings based on Reed II in determining ownership of near-surface uranium). Accordingly, the surface estate owner will own a near-surface substance upon proof that any reasonable method of removing the substance will destroy the surface. See Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
110. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (court states that tests announced establish ownership of at or near surface substances). Similarly, the Reed I surface
destruction test determines ownership of near-surface substances. See Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). The Acker surface destruction test, however, was not dependent upon the exact location of the substance. See
Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (location of the substance not mentioned in
the statement of the surface destruction test); see also Note, Abandonment of the Surface Destruction Test in Determining Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 699, 717 (1984) (location of substance irrelevant to application
of Acker).
111. Cf Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 180 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (maximum depth for strip-mining is 200 feet below surface). Substances deposited only below two
hundred feet, and which can be extracted by wells or shafts, should belong to the mineral
estate owner. See Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 113
(1949) (mineral owner has right of access to valuable substances removable without unreasonable interference with surface uses); see also Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex. 1980)
(Spears, J., concurring) (discussing rule which would entitle mineral owner to substances extractible by wells or shafts). But see Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 175 & n.2 (Tex. 1977)
(Daniel, J., dissenting) (shallow and deep coal and lignite deposits should belong to surface
estate because shaft mining unreasonably burdens the surface).
112. 658 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488 (June 12,
1985).
113. See id. at 823. The reservation of "all the minerals" severed the mineral and surface
estates, and the State owns the mineral estate while Schwarz owns the surface estate. See id. at
823.
114. See id. at 823.
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owner of the mineral estate, owned the coal and lignite since these substances are within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term "minerals." 15 After issuing Moser II, the Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ
6
of error to hear Schwarz. 11
The supreme court rejected the State's argument that early Texas statutes
governing the sale of public land specifically reserved coal and lignite to the
State."1 7 Concluding that the legislature made only a general reservation of
minerals in the statutes, the court proceeded to construe the word "minerals" in the 1907 severing instrument." 8 The court decided that Acker and
Reed should be used in construing a general reservation of minerals by the
State from a conveyance of the surface to a private individual." 9 Accord-

115. See id. at 823. The court relied upon the statement in Moser I that the Acker and
Reed approach was abandoned. See id. at 823. Under one interpretation of Moser I the court
could have applied the Reed I surface destruction test since that was the law in effect when
Schwarz executed the coal and lignite lease in 1978. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8, 1983) (law in effect at execution controls for leases executed
between February 10, 1971 and June 8, 1983), opinion withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
One explanation for the court's application of the Moser ordinary meaning test to the Schwarz
facts is that the instrument being construed was the 1907 patent, and this instrument was not
executed between February 10, 1971 and June 8, 1983. See Note, Mines and Minerals- Title
to Minerals - Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 477, 490 (1984) (Moser
applies to time period before Acker); Note, Abandonment of the Surface Destruction Test in
Determining Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 15 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 699, 718 (1984) (instruments executed before February 10, 1971 controlled by
ordinary meaning test). The appellate court's manipulation of the language from Moser I illustrates the need for specific guidelines from the supreme court when a newly announced rule is
not given full retroactive operation. Cf Newman v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc., 601 S.W.2d
754, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980) (court decided how new rule applied because supreme
court did not provide specific guidelines), affid in part and rev'd in part per curiam, 612 S.W.2d
198, 198 (Tex. 1980) (court of appeals should not have applied new rule because cause of
action arose before decision announcing new rule).
116. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 22 (October 10, 1984) (granting writ)
with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) (decided June 27, 1984).
The supreme court granted writ of error on two points: (1) the court of appeals' holding is in
conflict with the Acker and Reed decisions; and (2) the Moser ordinary meaning test should not
have been applied because the lease was executed during the period when the surface destruction test was in effect. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 22, 22 (October 10, 1984)
(granting writ).
117. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 490-91 (June 12, 1985). The court also
rejected the argument that the 1907 Land Sales Act reserved all minerals to the State and
allowed surface destruction by the State. See id. at 489-90.
118. See id. at 491. Although the legislature had not specifically reserved coal when the
1907 patent was issued, the opinion indicates that patents issued under the 1919 Land Sales
Act do specifically reserve coal to the State. See id. at 490-91.
119. See id. at 491. Earlier in the opinion, the court noted that Moser 11 did not abandon
Acker and Reed for determining the ownership of near-surface coal, lignite, and iron in disputes between private parties. See id. at 489. The court decided that the surface-preservation
principle underlying Acker and Reed applies with equal force to a conveyance of the surface by
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ingly, the ownership of the coal and lignite was determined by applying a
two-step approach: (1) the 1907 patent was examined, and no fairly expressed specific intention to include coal and lignite as minerals was
found;1"' (2) the court concluded that Schwarz had satisfied the proof requirements of the Reed II surface destruction test. 2 1 Reversing the court of
appeals' judgment, the court held that the coal and lignite belonged to
22
Schwarz. 1
Schwarz is significant because it illustrates the very minimal impact that
Moser H has on Texas mineral ownership law. 12 3 In Moser II, the supreme
court identified the surface destruction test as the source of mineral title
uncertainty.1 24 Yet one year later, in Schwarz, the court reaffirms the application of the surface destruction test for near-surface coal, lignite, and iron
ore.' 2 5 Since Acker was decided, coal and lignite titles have been the most
often litigated mineral titles in Texas courts. 1 26 Schwarz ensures that more
coal and lignite title suits will inevitably arise. 127 Therefore, Schwarz marks
28
a continued retreat from the overall purpose of Moser H- title certainty. 1

the State to a private individual. See id. at 491. Justice McGee reasoned that an individual
purchasing land early in Texas' history would not expect the surface of the land to be destroyed thereby promoting family and agricultural uses. See id. at 491.
120. See id. at 491. The court noted that the instrument did not specifically list coal and
lignite, nor did the language in the instrument fairly express an intention to allow the mineral
estate owner to destroy the surface when removing minerals. See id. at 491.
121. See id. at 491. Compare id. at 491 (coal and lignite near-surface and surface of
Schwarz' land destroyed by strip-mining) with Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)
(near-surface coal and lignite belong to surface estate owner if reasonable removal method,
such as strip-mining, would destroy surface).
122. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985).
123. Cf. id. at 489 (Moser II did not abandon Acker and Reed for determining ownership
of near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588
(Tex. 1985) (Moser II applies only to severances occurring after June 8, 1983).
124. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
125. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985).
126. See, e.g., Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 488 (June 12, 1985) (ownership of
coal and lignite disputed); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (coal and lignite title suit); Williford v. Spies, 530
S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (ownership of coal and lignite
disputed).
127. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (reaffirms
application of surface destruction test for near-surface coal and lignite) with Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (Reed II rule guarantees decades of litigation narrowing fact issues); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985)
(Ray, J., dissenting) (titles cannot be safely determined under Acker and Reed without
litigation).
128. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (application
of surface destruction test reaffirmed) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99,
101 (Tex. 1984) (application of surface destruction test causes title uncertainty).
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RECENT EXPANSION OF THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST

While the scope of the ordinary meaning test has been progressively narrowed since Moser I, 129 the parameters of the surface destruction test have
steadily expanded. 3 ° In Friedman, the court contributed to this unfortunate expansion by applying the surface destruction test to uranium even
though neither Acker nor Reed involved title to uranium. 31 The trend was
furthered in both Friedman and Schwarz; the surface destruction test was
applied by the supreme court for the first time in determining ownership of
13 2
substances which did not outcrop on the surface.
In Schwarz, the supreme court faced the task of construing wording other
than "oil, gas and other minerals" in a mineral ownership case for the first
time in over thirty years. 133 The application of Acker and Reed to the "all
129. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 428 (June 8,
1983) (surface destruction test abandoned), withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) with Moser
v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (surface destruction test abandoned only "in the case of uranium") (emphasis added) and Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Moser IH ordinary meaning test applies only to severances made
after June 8, 1983).
130. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8,
1983) (surface destruction test controls only instruments executed between February 10, 1971
and June 8, 1983), withdrawn, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) with Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (for uranium, surface destruction test governs all severances
made before June 8, 1983); see also Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489-91 (June 12,
1985) (court applies surface destruction test to broad "all the minerals" reservation, and to a
conveyance involving the State of Texas).
131. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting)
(opposing expansion of surface destruction test to uranium and noting that Acker and Reed did
not involve title to uranium); see also Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980) (title to
lignite disputed); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 197 1) (title to iron ore disputed).
Furthermore, although the court applied the Reed II surface destruction test, the statement of
the test in Reed II does not mention uranium. Compare Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d
586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (court follows jury findings made under Reed II) with Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (only coal, lignite, and iron ore listed with the test).
132. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (coal located
50 feet below surface) and Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. 1985) (uranium located 29 feet below surface) with Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. 1980)
(lignite outcropped on the surface of the surface owner's land) and Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971) (iron ore outcropped on the surface of the land). The substance
deposits involved in both Friedman and Schwarz meet the Reed II definition of near-surface.
Compare Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. 1985) (uranium deposited
within 29 feet of surface) and Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985)
(coal deposited within 50 feet of surface) with Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980)
(as a matter of law, deposit within 200 feet of surface is near-surface).
133. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) ("all the minerals"
construed to determine coal and lignite ownership); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. 1985) ("oil, gas and other minerals" construed to determine uranium
ownership); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1984) ("oil, gas and
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the minerals" clause in Schwarz indicates that the surface destruction test
will extend to broad mineral conveyances as well as to general conveyances
of "other minerals."' 3 4 Finally, in Schwarz, the court has broadened the
surface destruction test by applying that test, for the3 5 first time, to a mineral
transaction between the State and a private party.1
VIII.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The Moser II - Friedman - Schwarz trilogy of decisions evidences a desire
by the Supreme Court of Texas to protect rights acquired by those relying
upon the Acker and Reed surface destruction holdings.' 3 6 The current status of mineral ownership law provides blanket protection for public reliance
on Acker and Reed. 3' 7 However, the goals of eliminating title uncertainty
and determining ownership of unnamed substances from the language in the
severing instrument alone are frustrated because of a continued allegiance to
the surface destruction test.138 This author's solution is premised upon the
other minerals" construed to determine uranium ownership); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743,
744 (Tex. 1980) ("oil, gas and other minerals" construed to determine coal and lignite ownership); Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Inc., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. 1973) ("oil, gas
and other minerals" construed to determine salt water ownership); Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971) ("oil, gas and other minerals" construed to determine iron ore
ownership); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 514, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1949) ("the mineral
rights" construed to determine limestone ownership).
134. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.488, 489-91 (June 12, 1985) (Acker
and Reed rules used to construe "all the minerals") with Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d
586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (for uranium, Acker and Reed rules apply to "other minerals" severances
made before June 8, 1983) (emphasis added).
135. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489-91 (June 12, 1985) (court notes
that Acker and Reed involved ownership disputes between private parties yet applies surface
destruction test in dispute between State of Texas and a private party).
136. See, e.g., Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489-91 (June 12, 1985) (surface
destruction test applied in case where surface estate owner executed coal and lignite mining
lease in 1978); Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1985) (surface destruction
test applied where uranium mining lease executed by surface estate owner in 1977); Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (public reliance on Acker and Reed
cited as justification for limiting Moser II to prospective application).
137. See, e.g., Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (application
of Acker and Reed reaffirmed for near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore); Friedman v. Texaco,
Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. 1985) (Acker and Reed apply to uranium for all severances
made before June 8, 1983); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984)
(ordinary meaning rule operates only prospectively because of public reliance on Acker and
Reed).
138. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (application
of surface destruction test recognized and reaffirmed) with Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,
676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (application of surface destruction test causes title uncertainty
and title determinations cannot be made from instrument alone); see also Friedman v. Texaco,
Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (uranium ownership for all severances made before June 8, 1983 is uncertain and title cannot be determined from instrument
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test is essenrealization that a total abandonment of the surface13 destruction
9
tial for achieving mineral title certainty in Texas.
Justice Ray, in his dissenting opinion in Friedman, persuasively argues
that title to uranium for all pre-June 8, 1983 severances of "other minerals"

will depend upon future findings of fact conducted in Texas courtrooms.'40

Justice Ray suggests that the Moser II time limitation be dissolved, thus
allowing uranium14to belong to the mineral estate under all severances of
"other minerals."

1

There are seven major reasons which support an extension of Justice
Ray's suggestion so that the Moser II ordinary meaning test would be applied to all severances of "minerals" in Texas instruments. First, the Moser
II ordinary meaning test accurately reflects the general intent of the parties
in a general mineral conveyance: to include valuable substances as minerals.' 4 2 Second, coal, lignite, iron ore, and uranium have always been miner-

alone); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Spears, J., concurring) (certainty not provided
by Reed II rule because ownership cannot be determined from instrument alone).
139. Accord Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 752 (Texas 1980) (Spears, J., concurring)
(urging total abandonment of surface destruction rule); accord also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.,
691 S.W.2d 586, 590-91 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (opposing extension of surface destruction test to uranium because Acker and Reed fact issues cause title uncertainty). Justice
Spears has stressed that: "[t]his court should totally abandon the mire of factual differences
requiring a tract-by-tract determination of mineral ownership by extrinsic evidence and move
to higher solid ground. The expeditious development of Texas lignite as a vitally needed
source of energy in the immediate future is at stake." Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 752
(Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
140. See Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 590 (arguing uranium has always been a mineral and severance date
should not change mineral status); see also Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99,
101-03 (Tex. 1984) (classifying uranium as mineral as matter of law, but limiting opinion to
prospective operation).
142. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (minerals "include all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether
their presence or value is known at the time of severance") with Kuntz, The Law Relating to
Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112-13 (1949) (when "minerals" are severed, general intent is for mineral estate to include all substances presently valuable and all substances
which become valuable in future); see also Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-18, 217 S.W.2d
994, 997 (1949) (ordinary and natural meaning contemplates valuable substances and presumptively effectuates intent because parties are familiar with natural meaning of words they
use). If a specific intent to include or to exclude a particular substance is expressed by the
language in the severing instrument, however, that intent should always control. See Kuntz,
The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949); see also Acker v.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (fairly expressed intention will include a surfacedestructible substance as a mineral); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997
(1949) (clear indication of scope of "minerals" may expand or restrict ordinary and natural
meaning). The Supreme Court of Texas has often looked to Professor Kuntz' article for guidance in determining what substances are minerals. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,
676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). However,
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als within the ordinary meaning of the word, and Acker and Reed did not

purport to state an absolute rule that these substances would always belong
to the surface estate. 1 43 Third, the present Moser H - Friedman - Schwarz

approach does not confine future title litigation to uranium.'" Fourth, as
Justice Spears pointed out in his Reed H concurrence, parties reasonably
relying upon Acker and Reed should not be harmed by a new rule since they
should have taken certain precautions to safeguard their own rights through
contractual agreements. 45 Fifth, current Texas mineral ownership law
presents a unique situation; while the policy of land title stability is usually

the surface destruction approach is not consistent with Professor Kuntz' suggestions. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 491 (June 12, 1985) (no specific intent found, so
ownership of valuable substances coal and lignite depends upon application of surface destruction test) with Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112-14
(1949) (if no specific intent found, general intent should be that all valuable substances belong
to mineral estate).
143. See Storm Assocs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982), aff'd sub nom., Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (1985); see also
Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (uranium
always a mineral); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (ores, coal, and lignite
ordinarily minerals without application of surface destruction test), modified, 597 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351-53 (Tex. 1971) (iron ore is a mineral, but
belongs to surface estate under surface destruction test). One Texas court stated:
We do not read Acker and the Reed cases to mean that iron ore, coal, and lignite are not
minerals in scientific, geological, and practical terms. We understand the court to say
that because of the proximity to the surface of those substances, and the general intention
of a surface estate owner not to have his land destroyed, those substances were not a part
of the mineral estate in those particularcases.
Storm Assocs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982)
(emphasis added), affid sub nom., Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
144. Compare Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985) (reaffirming
application of Acker and Reed to near-surface coal, lignite, and iron ore) and Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (continued adherence to Reed II) with
Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (title determinations cannot be safely made under Acker and Reed without litigation) and Reed v. Wylie,
597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (Reed II rule will require decades of
litigation narrowing fact issues).
145. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751-52 (Tex. 1984) (Spears, J., concurring); see
also Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law. Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV.
201, 243 (1965) (discrimination against one who does not ascertain a current property rule is
reasonable). Fee simple owners of a tract of land should have specifically granted or reserved
coal, lignite, and iron ore. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751-52 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J.,
concurring); see also STATE BAR OF TEXAS, LEGAL FORM MANUAL FOR REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 4.8 (1982) (warns contracting parties to specify coal, lignite, iron, and uranium in mineral reservation). People who wished to develop coal, lignite, or iron ore under a
severance of "other minerals" should have purchased mining rights from both the mineral
estate owner and the surface estate owner. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 752 (Tex.
1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
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promoted by adherence to property law precedents,1 46 adherence to Acker
and Reed actually promotes title instability. 147 Sixth, the legal topography
in Texas invites an abandonment of the surface destruction test because existing case law, existing statutes, and additional legislation can adequately
protect the surface estate. 4 Finally, the Moser II ordinary meaning test
should not be applied only prospectively because it does not represent a new
legal principle. 149

146. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30-31
(Tex. 1978) (precedent very important where property transactions involved); Currier, Time
and Change in Judge-Made Law.: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 242 (1965)
(societal interest in land title stability dictates and contracting parties expect that property
transactions will be governed by rules effective at time of reliance).
147. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (Acker and
Reed approach causes title uncertainty).
148. See id. at 103 (creates economic barrier which will deter destruction of surface because mineral estate owner is strictly liable for surface destruction caused by removal of substance owned under conveyance or reservation of "other minerals"); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker,
483 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex. 1972) (mineral owner restricted to reasonably necessary use of
surface for mineral development); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621-22 (Tex. 1971)
(mineral owner must show due regard for rights of surface owner which requires adoption of
reasonable alternatives to avoid impairment of and interference with existing surface uses);
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-132.000 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1985) (Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act protects surface estate by requiring mining operator to
adopt surface restoration plan); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11, §§ 1-38 (Vernon
Supp. 1985) (Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act requires coal and lignite operators to restore surface after conducting surface mining operations and provides penalities for
non-compliance). Statutory and judicial safeguards against surface destruction greatly influenced the court's decision to classify uranium as a mineral in Moser II. See Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 & n.4 (Tex. 1984) (court recognizes that reasonable use
doctrine, due regard doctrine, and Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act provide deterrent to surface destruction). Similar safeguards for coal provide ample protection for
public environmental interests and the interests of the surface estate owner, while encouraging
responsible coal production by the mineral estate owner. See Comment, The Right to Mine
Texas Uranium and Coal by Surface Methods: Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV.
451, 462-79 (1976). Abandoning the surface destruction test would enable the supreme court
to encourage compliance with the present legislative policy to deter unreasonable surface use
by mineral operators, even though additional legislation concerning surface use is inevitable.
Cf Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978)
(court, in adopting new subsidence liability rule, recognized that future legislative action in
subsidence area was inevitable).
149. Compare Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (decision to be limited
to prospective application must establish new legal principle by overruling clear precedent or
by deciding question of first impression) with Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 752 (Tex. 1980)
(Spears, J., concurring) (urging adoption of new rule because surface destruction, general intent rule is not clear); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Acker and Reed
set out factual, not legal, guidelines) (emphasis added); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676
S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (noting that "other minerals" has been construed many times by
Texas courts). The ordinary meaning test was already an established rule of construction in
property law when the supreme court formally adopted the test for determining mineral own-
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If the Moser H ordinary meaning test is applied both prospectively and
retrospectively, any remaining title uncertainty would only be over which
substances are within the ordinary meaning of minerals. "o This uncertainty
could be partially eliminated by following prior judicial classifications of specific substances as mineral or non-mineral as a matter of law. 5 ' The owner
of the mineral estate, however, should be entitled to all substances that are
within the natural meaning of minerals.' 52
The supreme court could also decide to leave the "ordinary and natural
meaning" of minerals for judicial clarification on a case-by-case, substanceby-substance basis.' 53 Such an approach would require expensive litigation,
and uncertainty would continue until each known substance was judicially
catalogued as within or not within the ordinary meaning of minerals.' 54 The
Texas Legislature could heed its constitutional mandate to promote the development of natural resources, 55 and avoid substance-by-substance litigation, by enacting a statute listing all substances within the ordinary meaning
of minerals.' 56 Once the composition of the ordinary meaning of minerals is
settled, the title examiner will have a list of substances, belonging to either
ership in 1949. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). Furthermore, the rationale behind both Heinatz and Acker was that the ordinary meaning of minerals
does not include substances that have a close physical relationship with the soil. See Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 182 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting); see also Robinson v. Robbins
Petroleum Corp., Inc., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Tex. 1973) (Acker and Heinatz hold that

certain substances having close relationship to surface are not minerals).
150. Cf Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (uranium is
the only substance classified under the ordinary meaning test).
151. See id. at 101-02 (court follows substance classifications that have already been
made).
152. See id. at 102 ("minerals" encompasses all substances within natural meaning of the
word) (emphasis added). Where substances to be included as minerals are not specified, and
no specific intent to exclude particular substances is evident from the face of the instrument,
the parties' general intent to exact a complete severance of all minerals should be effectuated.
See Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949).
153. Cf Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (court's
discussion limited to "in the case of uranium"). In Moser II, the court noted that certain
substances have already been classified "on a substance-by-substance basis." See id. at 101.
154. See Note, Mines and Minerals - Title to Minerals - Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 477, 486 & n.56 (1984) (title suits will continue while doubt remains
as to what substances are covered by ordinary meaning of minerals).
155. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59 (legislature shall pass laws to promote public rights
in resource development and conservation); see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.002(1)
(Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1985) (legislature declares policy that surface extraction of minerals
essential to state economic well-being).
156. Cf TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 131.004(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (defining "minerals" as uranium and uranium ore for Uranium Surface Mining & Reclamation Act purposes); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11, § 3(10) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (defining
"other minerals" as clay, gravel, stone, sand, ores, and other commercially valuable hard substances for Coal Mining and Reclamation Act purposes).
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the surface estate or to the mineral estate as a matter of law, from which to
determine ownership rights. 5 7 Mineral titles could then be determined by
simply examining the instrument itself without referring to extrinsic factual
factors, thereby fulfilling the primary purpose of Moser II - title certainty.
As with any departure from precedent, changing mineral ownership law
in Texas will create short-term inequities.15 Justice Cardozo, in the celebrated opinion of GreatN. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref Co., 159 stated that state
courts have broad discretion "in defining the limits of adherence to precedent." 1" With Cardozo's words in mind, the inescapable conclusion follows
that the overriding, long-term public interests in title certainty and resource
development should not be sacrificed to protect those people who assumed
that they had rights under the1 surface
destruction tests which could be con61
firmed only in the courtroom.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In Moser , the Supreme Court of Texas devised a test which could eventually eliminate the mineral title uncertainty caused by the factual inquiries
accompanying the surface destruction tests. However, the surface destruction factor had become firmly entrenched in Texas mineral jurisprudence,
and the court, in retreating from Moser I with the Moser II opinion, chose to

157. Cf Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101-02 (Tex. 1984) (sand,
gravel, water, limestone, building stone, surface shale, caliche, uranium, and solid sulphur

classified as a matter of law). Substance classifications should be flexible, however, so that
substances becoming valuable through future technological improvements can be classified as
minerals. See Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 113
(1949).
158. See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REV. 201, 241 (1965) (societal value of equality is necessarily impaired when precedents are
overruled); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (mineral owner's rights under Heinatz ordinary meaning test and Cain v. Neumann
precedents sacrificed as majority attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable Moser, Reed, and
Acker decisions).
159. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
160. See id. at 364.
161. Compare Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (application of surface destruction test causes mineral title uncertainty) with Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949) (rule affording mineral title
certainty best serves policy favoring resource development); see also Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.,
691 S.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Tex. 1985) (Ray, J., dissenting) (mineral titles cannot be safely determined under Acker and Reed without litigation); Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in
Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949) (title examiner never confident of ownership determinations under rule requiring inquiry into factual setting). Stare decisis does not mandate adherence to precedent where such adherence allows confusing, conflicting, and obstructive
opinions to remain the law. See Hanks v. McDannell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1948).
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expand the surface destruction test rather than to uproot it. The Schwarz
and Friedman decisions have continued this retreat and perpetuated the use
of the surface destruction test. Consequently, the law preceding the Moser
opinions remains substantially intact, and the ordinary meaning test will
have a very limited impact on Texas mineral ownership law.
Determining mineral ownership after Moser II requires untangling a confusing conglomeration of divisions in the law based upon time, the exact
substance involved, the exact location of the substance involved, the status of
the parties to a mineral transaction, and possibly, the wording of the severing clause being construed. The supreme court should strive to dissolve
these divisions while remembering that title certainty lies in expanding the
ordinary meaning test and not in clinging to the surface destruction test.
Simplicity, consistency, and certainty can be achieved by applying the ordinary meaning test exclusively and by totally abandoning consideration of
factors outside the actual instrument conveying or reserving the minerals.
Without such simplification, Moser II will be a landmark only in the sense
that it stands as a judicial obstacle to the development of Texas' natural
resources.
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